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Abstract
“No trade” theorems establish that, in various trading environments, investors
who share a common prior will not engage in speculation, as long as expected util-
ity, Bayesian updating and full awareness are imposed. We relax the last assumption
by allowing for asymmetric unawareness and examine under which conditions spec-
ulative behavior emerges. We find that if common knowledge is assumed (as in the
settings of Aumann [1976] and Milgrom and Stokey [1982]), unawareness cannot gener-
ate speculation. This is not true, however, in settings where no common knowledge is
assumed, such as speculation in equilibrium (Geanakoplos [1989]) and betting that is
always beneficial (Morris [1994]), unless stronger conditions on awareness are imposed.
JEL-Classifications: C70, C72, D80, D82.
Keywords: unawareness, trade, speculation, knowledge, common knowledge, bounded
perception, awareness.
1 Introduction
A well established behavioral implication of the common prior assumption (Harsanyi
[1968]) is that it precludes speculation, a result which is robust to the particular de-
tails of the trading environment and stems from the no-agreeing-to-disagree result of
Aumann [1976]. To focus on just four, Morris [1994], Samet [1998] and Feinberg [2000]
show that there cannot be a bet that makes everyone strictly better off and this is com-
mon knowledge (we henceforth call this speculative betting) or it is true at all states
(always beneficial bet). Geanakoplos [1989] shows that there cannot be trade from a
Pareto efficient allocation in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (speculation in equilibrium)
∗Some of the results in this paper also appear in a much earlier form in Galanis [2011b]. I am grate-
ful to two anonymous referees, Paulo Barelli, Piero Gottardi, Larry G. Epstein, Martin Meier, Herakles
Polemarchakis, Marzena Rostek, David Rahman, Fernando Vega-Redondo, Marek Weretka, Xiaojian Zhao,
seminar participants at the European University Institute, the University of Southampton, the Summer in
Birmingham workshop and the International Workshop on Unawareness, University of Queensland.
†Department of Economics, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK,
s.galanis@soton.ac.uk.
1
and Milgrom and Stokey [1982] show that if an allocation is ex ante Pareto efficient
it cannot be common knowledge in the interim stage that there is another allocation
that Pareto dominates it (speculative trade).1
One reason why the details of these trading environments do not matter is that
several idealised assumptions are imposed, such as expected utility, Bayesian updating
(implying Dynamic Consistency) and full awareness of the relevant dimensions of the
environment. In this paper we examine whether and how speculation occurs when the
last assumption is relaxed, so that some investors might be partially aware. We find
that the details of the trading environment matter for speculation and, in particular,
unawareness is compensated only by the property of common knowledge, which is
sufficient to ensure no speculation.
Specifically, we show that common priors imply the absence of speculative betting.
This result was also established in Heifetz et al. [2013a], however they also impose an
additional property in their framework, Projections Preserve Posteriors, which is not
needed.2 We also show that the converse is true. In particular, we identify a condition,
Enlargements Preserve Common Priors (EPCP), which requires that whenever there
is a “local” common prior generating beliefs within all public or self evident events at
each state space, there is also a common prior across all state spaces. This condition is
automatically satisfied in the standard model without unawareness and a unique state
space. We then show that no common priors and EPCP are equivalent to speculative
betting.
Second, as long as the payoff relevant state space, where allocations depend on,
coincides with the “common” state space, which is the most expressive state space that
it is common knowledge that everyone is aware of, speculative trade (which also imposes
common knowledge) cannot occur. This assumption would be true, for example, in the
case where the payoff relevant state space describes the prices of all possible stocks,
and this coincides with the common state space.
Unawareness, however, does break the connection between common priors and no
speculation in environments where common knowledge is not assumed. Examples 1
and 2 show that no common priors are neither sufficient nor necessary for the existence
of an always beneficial bet.3 However, under Conditional Independence, an always
beneficial bet implies no common priors. This property requires that investors do
not misunderstand the signal created by the information revealed by their varying
awareness.4 Moreover, under the stronger condition of Projections Preserve Posteriors,
no common “local” priors (in the state space where the bet is formulated) imply an
always beneficial bet. Finally, we show that speculation does not occur in equilibrium
1Although common priors are not required for the speculative trade theorem, a Pareto efficient allocation
necessitates some form of common priors, as we explain in footnote 23. Also, the setting is slightly different
from that of Milgrom and Stokey [1982], as we do not employ a signal structure but a type or belief structure.
2This property requires that posterior beliefs do not change as we project down to a state space describing
lower awareness.
3Note that, under unawareness, what is always true may not always be common knowledge, because some
unaware investors may fail to deduce it, due to their limited perception. As a result, an always beneficial
bet does not imply speculative betting, as in the standard setting.
4It was first studied by Galanis [2015, 2016a] in the context of analysing the value of information in
single-investor and multi-investor environments.
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if each investor’s information structure either satisfies Conditional Independence or
path-independence. This last property specifies that each attained level of awareness
specifies a unique path of successively lower levels of awareness that the investor has
attained in other states.
When common knowledge is not assumed, an always beneficial bet can occur with
a common prior because investors cannot reason properly about the information of
others, as their awareness may be too low. This forces them to take information at face
value, without being able to completely comprehend why others are selling when they
are buying. This “bias” in reasoning is consistent with empirical evidence in psychology
which shows that individuals are in general slow to incorporate additional information
because of their confidence in their existing assumptions and opinions (Fischhoff et al.
[1977]).5 Related is also the confirmatory bias, which suggests that once investors form
strong hypotheses, they tend to ignore new information that contradicts them (Rabin
[1998]).
These and other psychological biases have inspired a large literature in finance,
which generates speculative behavior with overconfident investors who overestimate
the precision of some signals and underestimate the precision of others.6 For example,
Scheinkman and Xiong [2003] explain speculative bubbles and large trading volumes
using two groups of investors and two signals that are publicly available. Each group is
overconfident about one signal, regarding the other signal (and the fact that the other
group is overconfident about it) as noise.
Most of these models assume that investors have a “wrong” perception of the signal
structure, which can be formalised by having different priors over it. The main differ-
ence of the present paper is that it endogenizes the investors’ speculative behavior by
explicitly modelling their awareness, without altering the common prior assumption,
thus providing an insight into why certain types of speculation occur whereas other do
not. Moreover, as we argue in Section 3.5, at least in some settings (e.g. correlated
equilibria), static models with different priors can always be reinterpreted as models
with common priors and investors with significant information processing errors. This
means that a model with different priors, which does not provide foundations for the
investors’ errors or limited perception, may nevertheless have implications about them
which are not clear.
Finally, examining speculation under various trading environments allows us to
differentiate, in terms of behavioral implications, between unawareness models, differ-
ent priors models (such as models with overconfidence) and models with information
processing errors represented by non-partitional structures (e.g. Geanakoplos [1989]).
1.1 Related Literature
The literature on no trade theorems stems from Aumann [1976], who shows that a
common prior implies that it cannot be common knowledge that the posteriors are
different. Investors trade because they have different priors, they have no common
5See also Oskamp [1965], Mahajan [1992] and Paese and Kinnaly [1993] in the psychology literature.
6See Daniel and Hirshleifer [2015] for a survey. I thank a referee for pointing out the connection to the
overconfidence literature.
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knowledge or they make information processing errors, for example by being unaware.
In the context of the standard model where investors make no mistakes, Morris [1994],
Bonanno and Nehring [1996], Samet [1998], Feinberg [2000], Ng [2003] and Heifetz
[2006] show that a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a common prior
is that there is no bet for which all investors expect a positive gain always.7 Milgrom
and Stokey [1982] and Sebenius and Geanakoplos [1983] show that common priors imply
that there cannot be speculative trade in a two-period model. Ma [2001] and Halevy
[2004] generalize this result for general preferences that satisfy Dynamic Consistency,
whereas Galanis [2016c] shows that Dynamic Consistency can be weakened.
Although there are several explanations of why investors trade (e.g. liquidity
shocks) the consensus is that they cannot account for the great magnitude of trad-
ing that we observe, unless we allow for investors to agree to disagree or speculate.8
Harrison and Kreps [1978] generate excessive trading in a model without common
priors and no short sales. Scheinkman and Xiong [2003] use the same framework to
model trading in an environment where each investor is overconfident, overestimating
the informational content of some signals. Similarly, Daniel et al. [1998, 2001] show
how overconfidence increases trading volume. Eyster et al. [2015] show that disagree-
ment neglect, the inability to properly account for the informational content of prices
or others’ trades, is key in generating trading volume in large markets with dispersed
private information.
Geanakoplos [1989] examines speculation in an environment where investors share a
common prior but make information processing errors, modelled in a single state space
and non-partitional information structures.9 Dekel et al. [1998] argue that mistakes due
to unawareness cannot be modelled in the one state space framework of Geanakoplos
[1989]. Galanis [2013], Heifetz et al. [2013a] and Meier and Schipper [2014b] generalize
the no-agreeing-to-disagree result of Aumann [1976] in a model with unawareness, using
multiple state spaces.10
The paper implicitly assumes that investors are unaware of their own unawareness.
That is, they do not entertain the possibility that they might be missing something,
which could lead them, for example, to not trade even if their posterior beliefs specify
that this is beneficial, or conversely to trade when it is not. This assumption is made in
most of the unawareness literature. However, there are some papers (e.g. Halpern and
Reˆgo [2009], Board and Chung [2011a,b]) which explicitly model agents who are aware
of their own unawareness. Board and Chung [2011b] show that there is no trade if,
either everyone believes that there is nothing they are unaware of, or everyone believes
that there is something that they are unaware of. In a more applied setting and without
7Note that in the standard model without unawareness, what is always true is also always common
knowledge. Conversely, if something is common knowledge, it is always true within this common knowledge
event.
8See discussion in Hong and Stein [2007] and Daniel and Hirshleifer [2015], for example.
9We compare his model with ours in more detail in Section 3.5.
10There is now a large literature on unawareness, beginning with Fagin and Halpern [1988]. For interactive
models with unawareness, see Modica and Rustichini [1994, 1999], Halpern [2001], Heifetz et al. [2006],
Halpern and Reˆgo [2008], Li [2009], Heifetz et al. [2008], Galanis [2011a], Chen et al. [2012] and Galanis
[2013]. For games with unawareness, see Feinberg [2012], Reˆgo and Halpern [2012], Heifetz et al. [2013b],
Meier and Schipper [2014a] and Halpern and Reˆgo [2014].
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providing a formal model of unawareness, Tirole [2009] examines contracting between
a seller and a buyer who are aware that they are unaware. Gabaix and Laibson [2006]
show that firms will optimally shroud high-priced add ons from unaware consumers, a
fact which is exploited by fully aware consumers. Moreover, informational shrouding
occurs even in highly competitive markets or markets with costless advertising.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3 we ex-
amine speculative behavior in four different environments, namely speculative betting,
always beneficial bet, speculation in equilibrium and speculative trade. Section 3.5
compares our approach with models that generate speculation through different priors
or non-partitional information structures. Section 4 concludes. Proofs are contained
in the Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Preliminaries
Different levels of awareness are represented by disjoint state spaces. Let S = {Sa}a∈A
be the finite collection of all these state spaces. We assume that S is a complete lattice
and endow it with a partial order .11 If S  S′, we say that S′ is (weakly) more
expressive than S or, equivalently, that an investor whose state space is S′ is more
aware than an investor whose state space is S. By construction, there is a top and a
bottom state space, which we call the full state space S∗ and the payoff relevant state
space S0, respectively. That is, for all S ∈ S, S0  S  S∗.
A state s is an element of some state space S. Let Σ =
⋃
S∈S
S be the set of all states.
We assume that every state space S ∈ S has finitely many states. An event E is a
subset of some state space S ∈ S, which we denote by S(E).
If S  S′, so that S′ is more expressive than S, we require that each state s′ ∈ S′
can be mapped to its “restricted” image in the less expressive S. Formally, we require
that there is a surjective projection rS
′
S : S
′ → S. Projections are required to commute:
if S  S′  S′′, then rS′′S = rS
′
S ◦ rS
′′
S′ .
Let E,E′ ⊆ Σ and suppose that for each s ∈ E, s′ ∈ E′, where s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′, we
have S′  S. We then write E′  E, because all states in E′ describe higher awareness
than all states in E. We denote the projection of set E′  S to the less expressive S
by E′S =
⋃{rS′S (s′) ∈ S : s′ ∈ E′}. We denote the enlargement of E′  S′′ to the more
expressive S′′ by E′S
′′
=
⋃{s′′ ∈ S′′ : rS′′S′ (s′′) ∈ E′}.
2.2 Type structures
Let Sµ be the state space S ∈ S such that µ ∈ ∆S. If µ ∈ ∆S and S′  S then µ|S′
is the marginal of µ on S′, so that µ|S′(E) = µ(ES), where E ⊆ S′. For all events
E,F ⊆ S with µ(F ) > 0, let µ(E|F ) = µ(E∩F )µ(F ) be the probability of E conditional on
F .
11A complete lattice is a partially ordered set in which all subsets G ⊆ S have both a supremum (or join,
denoted
∨G ) and an infimum (or meet, denoted ∧G).
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Definition 1. For each investor i ∈ I, there is a type mapping ti : Σ → ⋃
S∈S
∆S,
satisfying the following properties:
0. Confinement: If s ∈ S then ti(s) ∈ ∆S′ for some S′  S.
1. If S′′  S′  S, s ∈ S′′, and ti(s) ∈ ∆S then ti(sS′) = ti(s).
2. If S′′  S′  S, s ∈ S′′, s′ ∈ S′ and ti(s) = ti(s′) ∈ ∆S′ then ti(sS) = ti(s′S).
3. If S′′  S′  S, s ∈ S′′, and ti(sS′) ∈ ∆S then Sti(s)  S.
4. If S′′  S′  S, s ∈ S′′, and ti(s) ∈ ∆S′ then Sti(sS) = S.
Properties 0,1 and 3 are identical to the respective properties in Definition 1 of
Heifetz et al. [2013a]. Property 2 specifies that if s and s′ specify the same type for
i and therefore are indistinguishable by him, their projection to a lower state space
will also specify that the projections are indistinguishable. In other words, projections
preserve ignorance, which is a property first proposed by Heifetz et al. [2006] and
adopted by Galanis [2013]. Similarly, 4 corresponds to the property that projections
preserve awareness.12
Properties 2 and 4 are implied by Property 2 in Definition 1 of Heifetz et al. [2013a],
which we call Projections Preserve Posteriors.13
Definition 2 (Projections Preserve Posteriors). If S′′  S′  S, s ∈ S′′, ti(s) ∈ ∆S′
then ti(sS) = t
i(s)|S.
The requirement that ti(sS) = t
i(s)|S is twofold. First, since ti(s)|S is the marginal
of ti(s) on S, it is specified that ti(sS) ∈ ∆S, or equivalently Sti(sS) = S. This is exactly
Property 4 of Definition 1. Second, if both s and its projection to S, sS , describe that
investor i is aware of event E ⊆ S, then both s and sS specify the same posterior
beliefs about E. This is stronger than Property 2 of Definition 1, as the latter only
requires that the support of ti(s) (projected on S) cannot be larger than the support
of ti(sS).
Let Si(s) denote investor i’s state space at s ∈ Σ. In particular, Si : Σ→ S is such
that for any s ∈ Σ, Si(s) = S if ti(s) ∈ ∆S. If Si(s)  Sj(s) then we say that investor
i is more aware than investor j at s.
Let
P i(s) = {s1 ∈ Si(s) : ti(s) = ti(s1)}
be the event in Si(s) describing that i has the same beliefs as in s. This is the standard
possibility correspondence that here is not a primitive but derived by the type mapping.
The following Assumption allows us to interpret P i(s) as the event that i considers
possible at s.14
Assumption 1. If P i(s) ⊆ E for some event E, then ti(s)(E) = 1.
12Proposition 1 in the Appendix shows how properties about types translate to properties of possibility
correspondences, which are the primitives in Heifetz et al. [2006] and Galanis [2013].
13The name Projections Preserve Posteriors is not used by Heifetz et al. [2013a].
14This is similar to Assumption 1 in Heifetz et al. [2013a].
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Definition 3. An interactive unawareness belief structure is a tuple S = 〈S, {rSαSβ }SβSα , {ti}i∈I〉,
where S and each S ∈ S are finite.
We say that S is a positive belief structure if s′ ∈ P i(s) implies ti(s)(s′) > 0, for
all s ∈ Σ and i ∈ I. A similar assumption is made by Morris [1994] in his Definition
2.1, where all possible signals are given a positive posterior belief by each investor. For
simplicity, in all of our results we require a positive belief structure, which implies that
each investor considers the true state (up to his awareness) to be possible.
2.3 Events, belief and common knowledge
For state space S ∈ S and event E ⊆ S(E)  S, define
AiS(E) = {s ∈ S : Si(s)  S(E)}
to be the event “investor i is aware of E”, expressed in the language or vocabulary of
state space S. Define
BiS(E) = {s ∈ AiS(E) : ti(s)(ES) = 1}
to be the event “investor i believes (with probability 1) event E”, expressed in the
language or vocabulary of state space S.
The mutual belief operator of order 1 given S and event E ⊆ S(E)  S is
B1S(E) =
⋂
i∈I
BiS(E).
It expresses the event “up to order 1, everyone believes event E”, using the language
of state space S. The event “investor i believes that, up to order 1, everyone believes
event E”, using the language of S is given by operator
Bi,1S (E) = {s ∈ S : s ∈ BiS(B1Si(s)(E))}.
Event B1
Si(s)
(E) specifies that there is mutual belief of order 1 (that is, everyone believes
E), expressed in Si(s), which is the highest or most expressive state space that i is
aware of at s. If s ∈ BiS(B1Si(s)(E)), then i believes that there is mutual belief of order
1 at s.
Inductively, for every n > 1 we define
BnS(E) = B
n−1
S (E)
⋂
i∈I
Bi,n−1S (E)
to be the event “up to order n, everyone believes event E”, using the language of state
space S. In other words, everyone believes E, everyone believes that everyone believes
E, everyone believes that everyone believes that everyone believes E, up to order n,
where
Bi,n−1S (E) = {s ∈ S : s ∈ BiS(Bn−1Si(s)(E))}
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is the event “investor i believes that, up to order n − 1, everyone believes event E”,
using the language of S.
The common knowledge operator given S and event E ⊆ S(E)  S is
CBS(E) =
∞⋂
n=1
BnS(E).
Definition 4. Event E ⊆ S(E)  S is common knowledge at s ∈ S if s ∈ CBS(E).15
Although investors may have different awareness at a state s, there is a well defined
notion of a “common” state space, which is the “highest” state space that everyone is
aware of and this is common knowledge. Define
S∧(s) =
∨
{S′ ∈ S : s ∈ CBS(S′)}
to be the join of all state spaces that are common knowledge at s ∈ S. Galanis [2013]
shows that S∧(s) is the most expressive state space that it is common knowledge at s
that everyone is aware of.16
2.4 Common priors
In this section we define the notions of a positive, local and common prior. Let tuple
pi = {piS}S∈S ∈ ×
S∈S
∆S be a generalized prior if it is projective, so that for all S′′  S′
the marginal of piS′′ on S
′ is piS′ . It is a local prior for i given S if piS is a convex
combination of i’s beliefs in S, so that it generates i’s posterior beliefs for types that
some state in S describes they are aware of S. It is a prior given S if it is a local prior
for all less expressive S′  S. It is positive given S if it assigns positive probability to
all events P i(s), where s ∈ S specifies that i is aware of S.17
Definition 5. Generalized prior pi = {piS}S∈S is a local prior for i ∈ I given S ∈ S if,
for every event E ⊆ S, E ∩AiS(E) 6= ∅ implies
piS(E ∩AiS(E)) =
∑
s∈AiS(E)
ti(s)(E)piS({s}).
It is a positive local prior for i given S if, additionally, s ∈ AiS(S) implies piS(P i(s)) >
0. It is a (positive) prior for i given S if it is a local (positive) prior given every S′  S.
A common prior pi given S generates the posterior beliefs of each investor, for each
state s that belongs to S or to a less expressive state S′  S.
15As explained in the previous section, we require a positive belief structure for all of our results, implying
that every investor considers the true state (up to his awareness) to be possible. Because of this property,
we define the common knowledge, rather than the common belief, operator.
16Proposition 1 in the Appendix shows that the interactive unawareness belief structure implies possibility
correspondences with the properties assumed in Galanis [2013], so we can use his results.
17Aumann [1976] and Heifetz et al. [2013a] provide a similar restriction.
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Definition 6. Belief structure S has a (positive) common (local) prior given S if there
exists pi that is a (positive, local) prior given S for each i ∈ I.
An nonempty event E ⊆ S is public (or self evident) if s ∈ E implies P i(s) ⊆ E for
all i ∈ I. We say that E is a smallest public event if there does not exist public event
E′ 6= E such that E′ ⊆ E. The following property, Enlargements Preserve Common
Priors (EPCP), specifies that if there exist common local priors that can generate the
posterior beliefs within each smallest public event in common state space S∧(s), for
any s ∈ S, then there exists a positive common prior given S.
Definition 7 (Enlargements Preserve Common Priors (EPCP) given S ∈ S). If, for
each s ∈ S and smallest public event E ⊆ S∧(s) with sS∧(s) ∈ E, there exists a common
local prior piE given S∧(s) with supp piES∧(s) = E, then there exists a positive common
prior given S.
2.5 Awareness
In this section we group properties that describe different patterns of awareness.
Definition 8. Awareness for i is path-independent given S ∈ S if, for all s1, s2, s3 ∈ S,
if Si(s3)  Si(s1) and Si(s3)  Si(s2) then Si(s1)  Si(s2) or Si(s2)  Si(s1).
To interpret this property, consider the following example. Suppose that Si(s3)
denotes that investor i is aware of the theory of relativity at s3, whereas S
i(s1) denotes
being aware of basic math at s1 and S
i(s2) denotes being aware of basic physics at s2.
Path-independence specifies that if all three states of awareness are possible for i and
being aware of the theory of relativity implies being aware of basic math and basic
physics, then either being aware of basic math implies being aware of basic physics or
vice versa. In other words, it is not possible of being aware of basic math but not basic
physics (or vice versa), yet there exists a higher state of awareness (relativity theory)
that encompasses both math and physics.
For the next property, let
E iS(s) = {s1 ∈ S : Si(s) = Si(s1)}
be the event in S describing that the investor has the same awareness as in s ∈ S.
Operator E iS provides a partition of state space S, where each partition cell contains
all states in S that describe the same awareness for i. Hence, we can interpret E iS as an
awareness signal structure of i, given S, where signal k reveals the level of i’s awareness.
Note that if an investor is unaware of S, he is also unaware of E iS and therefore cannot
comprehend this signal structure. We call E iS the awareness signal of i, given S.
The next property, Conditional Independence, specifies that beliefs, conditional on
the information signal P i, do not change when we also condition on the awareness
signal E iS .
Definition 9. Investor i satisfies Conditional Independence given S ∈ S and prior pi
if, for any s ∈ S with piS(s) > 0, for any E ⊆ Si(s),
ti(s)(E) = piS(E
S |E iS(s) ∩ P i(s)S).
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Galanis [2016a] shows that if S satisfies Projections Preserve Posteriors and pi is a
prior given S for i, then i satisfies Conditional Independence given S and pi.
3 Results
Speculation is examined in four different settings. First, we characterize speculative
betting with respect to no common priors and EPCP. Second, under Conditional In-
dependence an always beneficial bet implies no common priors, whereas no common
local priors and Projections Preserve Posteriors imply no such trade. Third, under
either Conditional Independence or path-independence, there cannot be speculation in
equilibrium. Finally, in a dynamic setting, there can be no speculative trade if, ei-
ther the common and the payoff relevant state spaces coincide, or Projections Preserve
Posteriors is assumed.
3.1 Speculative betting
We first characterize speculative betting in terms of no common priors and EPCP. A
bet given S generates, at each state s ∈ S, gains or losses for each investor, that add
up to zero.
Definition 10. A bet b = {bi}i∈I given S ∈ S is a collection of functions bi : S → R,
such that
∑
i∈I
bi(s) = 0 for each s ∈ S.
Fix a bet b given S′. Investor i is aware of b at s ∈ S if his state space, Si(s), is
more expressive than S′, so that Si(s)  S′. Investor i expects positive gains from bet
b at s ∈ S if he is aware of it and ∑
s′∈Si(s)
ti(s)(s′)bi(s′S′) > 0.
Let
BbS = {s ∈ S : Si(s)  S′ and
∑
s′∈Si(s)
ti(s)(s′)bi(s′S′) > 0, ∀i ∈ I}
be the event, expressed in S, specifying that all investors are aware of and expect
positive gains from bet b given S′.
Recall that in the standard model without unawareness speculative betting char-
acterizes no positive common priors. The following theorem shows that speculative
betting characterizes no positive common priors and EPCP.18
Theorem 1. Positive belief structure S has no positive common prior and satisfies
EPCP given S if and only if BbS∧(s) is common knowledge at some s ∈ S and bet b
given S∧(s).
18Property EPCP is automatically satisfied in the standard environment without unawareness and a unique
state space. See Galanis [2016b] for Theorem 1 in the case of no unawareness.
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Heifetz et al. [2013a] show that speculative betting implies no positive common
priors, but they assume Projections Preserve Posteriors.19 This assumption is not
needed here but has behavioral implications. For example, Galanis [2015, 2016a] shows
that without Conditional Independence (and therefore without Projections Preserve
Posteriors), the value of information can be negative (positive) in single-investor (multi-
investor) environments with unawareness, which is the opposite of what is true in an
environment without unawareness.
Moreover, Heifetz et al. [2013a] do not provide a characterization of speculative
betting. In their Example 1, they show that no common prior does not imply the
existence of speculative betting. This is not inconsistent with Theorem 1, because
their example fails EPCP, hence Theorem 1 does not apply.
3.2 Betting that is always beneficial
What are the implications on beliefs if, instead of speculative betting, we assume that
there is a bet that always provides all investors with positive expected gains? We call
this an always beneficial bet. In the standard model where everyone is always fully
aware, an always beneficial bet implies speculative betting, because what is always true
is always common knowledge. Moreover, an always beneficial bet is equivalent to no
common priors (e.g. Samet [1998]).
With unawareness, however, what is always true may not be common knowledge.
As we illustrate in Example 1 below, the reason is that if an investor is not fully
aware, he may fail to realize that something is always true, as he can only reason up
to his awareness. Together with Example 2, we establish that in an environment with
unawareness no common priors are neither sufficient nor necessary for the existence of
a bet that makes all investors better off always.
We say that there is an always beneficial bet given S if there exists bet b given S0
such that BbS = S. Note that we define a bet given the lowest state space S0, rather
than state space S∧(s) which is common knowledge at s, as in the previous section.
The reason is that, as we do not invoke common knowledge, the “lowest” state space
that everyone is aware of may be S0. The results would be the same if, instead of S0,
we defined the bet on any other state space that all investors are always aware of.
Example 1. We show that the existence of an always beneficial bet does not imply
no common priors. The information structure is depicted in Figure 1. There are two
investors and four state spaces, S0, S1, S2 and S3, where S3  S1, S2  S0. Each state
space Si has three states, s
1
i , s
2
i and s
3
i . The projections are given by the thin arrows,
so that for k = 1, 2, 3, sk3 projects to s
k
1 and to s
k
2, whereas both project to s
k
0. The
common prior on S3 is (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
Investor 1’s information structure specifies that P 1(sjk) = Sk, where k, j = 1, 2, 3.
It is depicted in Figure 1 by the discontinuous lines, so that at each state he is com-
pletely uninformed. Investor 2’s information structure, depicted by the solid lines,
19They refer to speculative betting as speculative trade in their Theorem 1. They also show that the
converse is not true. As they only show one direction, they do not need to assume that the belief structure
is positive.
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Figure 1: Investors have common priors but bet always
specifies that P 2(s13) = {s11, s21} = P 2(s11) = P 2(s21), P 2(s23) = {s23}, P 2(s33) = {s22, s32} =
P 2(s22) = P
2(s32), P
2(s31) = P
2(s12) = P
2(sj0) = S0, where j = 1, 2, 3. The thick straight
arrows specify that at a state s ∈ S the investor 2’s awareness is at a lower state space
S′ ≺ S, whereas the curved arrows show that S′ = S.
Consider bet b = {bi}1,2 given S0 such that b1(s10) = 1, b1(s20) = −1.5, b1(s30) = 1,
whereas b2 = −b1. It is an always beneficial bet given S3 if for all states in S3, each
investor expects a strictly positive payoff from b.
At each sk3, k = 1, 2, 3, investor 1 is fully aware but completely uninformed. His
posterior on S0 is (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). His expected payoff from b
1 is 1/6. At s13, investor 2 is
aware of S1 and he considers {s11, s21} to be possible. His posterior on S0 is (1/2, 1/2, 0).
His expected payoff from b2 is 1/4. At s23, investor 2 is fully aware and knows that s
2
3
has occurred. His expected payoff is 1.5. At s33, he is aware of S2 and he considers
{s22, s32} to be possible. His posterior on S0 is (0, 1/2, 1/2) and his expected payoff is 1/4.
Hence, both investors always expect a strictly positive payoff from b. Theorem 2 shows
that such a bet cannot exist, as long as all investors satisfy Conditional Independence.
Although there exists a bet that always makes everyone strictly better off, such a
fact cannot be common knowledge. The only event that can be common knowledge is the
least expressive state space, S0. To see this, note that at s
1
3, investor 2 is aware of S1
and thinks that investor 1 is aware of S1 and his information is S1. Because investor
1 is completely uninformed at all states in S1, he does not know whether investor 2 is
aware of S1. In fact, he only knows that 2 is aware of S0. Investor 2 also knows that
investor 1 is aware of (and knows) S0.
The following theorem shows that an always beneficial bet implies that there cannot
be a common prior that satisfies Conditional Independence for each investor. Moreover,
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the converse does not hold. As we show in Example 2, even if Conditional Independence
and EPCP are satisfied, no common priors do not imply an always beneficial bet.
However, if we strengthen Conditional Independence to Projections Preserve Posteriors
and no common priors to no common local priors given S0, then all state spaces describe
that there is an always beneficial bet. In other words, if the investors’ posteriors in
the payoff relevant state space S0 are not common, then all state spaces describe an
always beneficial bet.
Theorem 2. Suppose there is a state space S and a bet b given S0 such that B
b
S =
S. Then, positive belief structure S has no common prior pi given S such that each
i ∈ I satisfies Conditional Independence given S and pi. Conversely, if positive belief
structure S satisfies Projections Preserve Posteriors, then no common local prior given
S0 implies that there is a bet b given S0 such that B
b
S = S, for all S ∈ S.
Example 2. We show that the non existence of an always beneficial bet does not
imply common priors, even if Conditional Independence and EPCP are satisfied. The
information structure is depicted in Figure 2. There are two investors who have no
common local priors given S0 and therefore no common prior, but there is no bet that
ensures positive expected gains at each full state, for both. However, there is speculative
betting.
There are two state spaces, S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} and S0 = {s5, s6}, such that S0  S,
s1S0 = s2S0 = s5 and s3S0 = s4S0 = s6. Investor 1 is always fully aware and P
1(s) = S
for all s ∈ S. For all s0 ∈ S0, P 1(s0) = S0. His information structure is depicted by
the discontinuous lines. His prior pi1 on S is (1/8, 1/2, 2/8, 1/8). In fact, this is the
only prior that can generate his posteriors. Investor 2’s possibility correspondence is
as follows: P 2(s1) = P
2(s4) = S0, P
2(s2) = {s2}, P 2(s3) = {s3}. For all s0 ∈ S0,
P 2(s0) = S0. His information structure is depicted by the solid lines. His prior assigns
1/4 to each s ∈ S. Since pi1 cannot generate 2’s posteriors, the investors have no
common priors. Moreover, the investors’ priors satisfy Conditional Independence. The
thick straight arrows specify that at a state s ∈ S the investor 2’s awareness is at a
lower state space S′ ≺ S, whereas the curved arrows show that S′ = S.
Suppose there is a bet b = {bi}1,2 given S0 such that
∑
s′∈Si(s)
ti(s)(s′)bi(s′S0) > 0, for
each s ∈ S, i = 1, 2. For investor 2 this means that b2(s5), b2(s6) > 0, because at s2, s3
he knows exactly which state in S is true. But since
∑
i∈I
bi(s) = 0 for each s ∈ S0, we
have b1(s5), b
1(s6) < 0, which implies
∑
s′∈S1(s)
t1(s)(s′)b1(s′S0) < 0. Hence, there is no
bet b given S0 such that B
b
S = S.
Note that the only public event is S0 and that there is no common local prior given
S∧(s1) = S0, because 1’s unique prior on S0 is (5/8, 3/8), whereas 2’s unique prior is
(1/2, 1/2). If we set b1(s5) = 1, b
1(s6) = −1.1 and b2 = −b1, then BbS∧(s1) is common
knowledge at s1.
It is important to note that, in the preceding examples and throughout the pa-
per, there is the implicit assumption that every investor is unaware that he might be
unaware of relevant dimensions of the problem he is facing. This is restrictive, but
consistent with most of the literature on unawareness. Relaxing this assumption has
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Figure 2: Investors have no common priors but do not bet always
consequences not only on the properties of interactive unawareness, but also on the
preferences that an investor might have. For example, the case for having preferences
represented by expected utility is less compelling when the investor knows that he is
missing some relevant dimensions that he cannot conceptualise. Although there are
some papers on interactive unawareness which formally model investors being aware
that they are unaware of “something” (e.g. Halpern and Reˆgo [2009], Board and Chung
[2011a,b]) and there is also a decision theoretic literature on coarse contingencies (e.g.
Epstein et al. [2007]), there is still no model that combines both approaches.20
3.3 Speculation in equilibrium
We now consider speculation in a game, adapting the framework of Geanakoplos [1989].
With unawareness, investors might speculate in equilibrium because they have an in-
complete understanding of other investors’ information and therefore of their actions.
As a result, they might be playing best response against a fictitious opponent that,
in reality, does not exist. However, we show that under Conditional Independence or
path-independence, if investors have a correct understanding of their payoffs at each
strategy profile, speculation cannot occur.
Definition 11. A Bayesian game with unawareness is a tuple (S, C, pi, (ui)i∈I), where
S is a positive belief structure, I is the finite set of investors, C = ×
i∈I
Ci is the set of
all action profiles, pi is the common prior given S∗ and ui : C × Σ → R denotes i’s
payoff function.
20See also the discussion in Section 1.1.
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We require that investor i’s strategy is measurable with respect to his type.
Definition 12. A strategy for investor i ∈ I is a function f i : Σ → Ci such that for
all s, s′ ∈ Σ, ti(s) = ti(s′) implies f i(s) = f i(s′).
A strategy profile is a tuple f = {f i}i∈I , where f(s) = ×
i∈I
f i(s) and f−i(s) =
×
j∈I\i
f j(s) for each s ∈ Σ. When choosing a best response at state s ∈ S and given
f−i, investor i who is unaware of S may have a wrong perception about what others
will play, because he is only aware of the less expressive state sS′ , where S
′ ≺ S.
If he chooses action ci and thinks he will get payoff ui(ci, f−i(sS′), sS′) at sS′ but
receives a different payoff ui(ci, f−i(s), s), then he may be surprised, realising that he
is unaware of something. Such a surprise cannot be part of an equilibrium, as the
investor understands that he may have played suboptimally. We therefore require in
equilibrium that ui(ci, f−i(sS′), sS′) = ui(ci, f−i(s), s). In other words, awareness does
not lead to a wrong perception of one’s payoffs in equilibrium.
Definition 13 (Projections Preserve Own Payoffs). A strategy profile f = {f i}i∈I
satisfies PPOP if for all i ∈ I, for all s ∈ Σ, ui(ci, f−i(s), s) = ui(ci, f−i(sS0), sS0), for
all ci ∈ Ci.
We emphasise that PPOP does not require that an unaware investor can reason
correctly about what his opponents are really playing, as f−i(s) 6= f−i(sS0) is allowed.
It only requires that if his opponents play f−i(s) at s ∈ S, then his payoff from
playing ci is the same, irrespective of whether his state space is S and reasons that
his opponents play f−i(s) at s, or if his state space is S′ ≺ S and reasons that they
play f−i(sS′) at sS′ .21 Hence, an investor may have a wrong theory of how others
are playing, however in equilibrium this does not influence his payoffs. This means
that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium which we define below cannot be interpreted as a
“self-confirming” equilibrium or as a result of a learning process.22 A Bayesian Nash
equilibrium with unawareness is required to satisfy PPOP.
Definition 14. Strategy profile f = {f i}i∈I constitutes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
with unawareness if it satisfies PPOP and for all s ∈ Σ, all i ∈ I and all ci ∈ Ci,∑
s′∈Si(s)
ui(f i(s′), f−i(s′), s′)ti(s)(s′) ≥
∑
s′∈Si(s)
ui(ci, f−i(s′), s′)ti(s)(s′).
Investor i’s ex ante expected utility from strategy profile f = {f j}j∈I is
U i(f) =
∑
s∗∈S∗
piS∗(s
∗)ui(f(s∗), s∗).
Note that if investor i’s state space in the ex ante stage is S ≺ S∗, his view of his ex
ante expected utility is U iS(f) =
∑
s∈S
piS(s)u
i(f(s), s). Because of PPOP, U iS(f) = U
i(f)
21Note that PPOP is automatically satisfied in Geanakoplos [1989], because nondelusion is assumed.
22Similar issues arise and are discussed in Feinberg [2012], Reˆgo and Halpern [2012], Grant and Quiggin
[2013], Halpern and Reˆgo [2014] and Meier and Schipper [2014a]. I thank a referee for pointing this out.
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if f is an equilibrium. Hence, we can interpret U iS(f) as what the investor thinks ex
post his ex ante expected utility had been.
Suppose that in the interim stage, when the investors have formulated their aware-
ness and beliefs, they realise that they had been at an ex ante Pareto efficient allocation
and have now an action to unilaterally stick to it. This means that each investor can
stick to his allocation and can guarantee for himself an ex ante payoff of u¯i, irrespective
of what everyone else is doing, by picking an action zi. Let z = ×
i∈I
zi be the resulting
action profile and [zi] the strategy that plays zi always. Moreover, there is no strategy
profile that ex ante can make everyone weakly better off and at least one strictly better
off. That is, if U i(f) ≥ u¯i for all i ∈ I, then f(s∗) = z for all s∗ ∈ S∗. Will they be
willing to speculate in equilibrium or stick to the Pareto optimal allocation? As the fol-
lowing theorem shows, they will not speculate, as long as either P i is path-independent
or i satisfies Conditional Independence, for each i ∈ I.
Theorem 3. Consider Bayesian game with unawareness (S, C, pi, (ui)i∈I) such that
either P i is path-independent or i satisfies Conditional Independence given pi and S∗,
for each i ∈ I. Moreover, suppose there exists an action profile z = ×
i∈I
zi such that for
all f = {f i}i∈I , U i([zi], f−i) = u¯i and if U i(f) ≥ u¯i for all i ∈ I, then f(s∗) = z for
all s∗ ∈ S∗. Then, there is a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium with unawareness, and
it has the property that f(s∗) = z for all s∗ ∈ S∗.
3.4 Speculative trade
Milgrom and Stokey [1982] showed that if an allocation is ex ante Pareto efficient it
cannot be common knowledge in the interim stage that there is a mutually beneficial
trade. In this section we examine under which conditions this no speculative trade
result holds in an environment with unawareness. Contrary to previous sections, the
current setting is dynamic, not static. More importantly, there is no common prior
assumption.23
There are two periods, the ex ante period 1 in which there is symmetric informa-
tion and awareness and the interim period 2 where there is differential awareness and
information.24 In period 1, types are described by positive belief structure S1, where
all investors are only aware of a payoff relevant state space S10 and have no informa-
tion. That is, S1 = {S10} and the belief structure S1 specifies a unique type ki(·),
so that ki(s) = ki(s′) ∈ ∆S10 for all s, s′ ∈ S10 . Moreover, supp ki(·) = S10 . We set
23Note that an initial allocation is Pareto efficient if and only if there is a common subjective belief, as
shown by Rigotti et al. [2008] in the context of convex preferences. In their terminology, a subjective belief
is different from a prior, as it is the normal (normalized to be a probability) of the supporting hyperplane of
the indifference curve at the initial allocation. If the allocation is not a full insurance one, a subjective belief
is not equal to the agent’s prior in the expected utility model, as it depends also on the derivatives of the
Bernoulli utilities. The result of Rigotti et al. [2008] is a generalization of the results of Billot et al. [2000,
2002], who characterize ex ante trading from a full insurance allocation, in terms of disjoint sets of priors,
using the Maxmin and Choquet expected utility models, which contain expected utility as a special case.
24There is also an unmodelled period 3 where all payoff relevant information is revealed and trades are
executed.
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ki(·) = pii1 ∈ ∆S10 and note that, by construction, pii1 is a positive local prior for i given
S10 .
There is a single consumption good, which we interpret as money, and investors
trade state contingent claims. Each investor i ∈ I is equipped with a strictly increasing
utility function ui : R+ → R+ over monetary outcomes. His endowment in period 1 is a
state contingent claim f i : S10 → R+, where S10 is the payoff relevant, or bottom, state
space. The aggregate endowment of the economy in period 1 is given by e : S10 → R++.
An allocation is a tuple f = (f1, . . . , fm), where f i : S10 → R+. It is feasible if∑m
i=1 f
i ≤ e.
In period 2, types are described by positive belief structure S2 and investors receive
differential information and awareness. Collection S2 contains multiple state spaces and
belief structure S2 allows for multiple types, where S20 is the bottom, or payoff relevant
state space. We assume that the payoff relevant state spaces in periods 1 and 2 are
identical, S10 = S
2
0 , so that there is no ambiguity on how state contingent claims are
defined across periods. We also assume that, for each i ∈ I, there exists a positive
prior pii for i given S ∈ S such that its marginal on S20 is equal to pii1, i’s local prior
given S10 in period 1.
An economy is a tuple C = 〈S1,S2, {ui}i∈I ,Θ, e〉 where S1, S2 are positive belief
structures. Ex ante Pareto efficiency is defined in the standard way.
Definition 15. Feasible allocation f of economy C is ex ante Pareto efficient if there
does not exist another feasible allocation g such that
∑
s∈S10
pii1(s)u
i(gi(sS10 )) ≥
∑
s∈S10
pii1(s)u
i(f i(sS10 ))
for all i ∈ I, with strict inequality for some j.
We say that in the interim period 2 there is speculative trade in economy C at
s ∈ S ∈ S2, if an allocation is ex ante Pareto efficient but it is common knowledge at
s that there exists a Pareto improvement. Let
Hg,fS,j =
s ∈ S ∈ S2 : ∑
s′∈Si(s)
ti(s)(s′)ui(gi(s′S20 ) ≥
∑
s′∈Si(s)
ti(s)(s′)ui(f i(s′S20 ) ∀i ∈ I,> for j

be the event in S which specifies that each i weakly prefers gi over f i and j strictly
prefers gj over f j .
Definition 16. There is speculative trade in economy C at s ∈ S ∈ S2 if there is an
ex ante Pareto efficient allocation f , an investor j ∈ I and feasible allocation g such
that event Hg,fS∧(s),j is common knowledge at s.
Note that Hg,fS∧(s),j is a subset of state space S
∧(s), which is defined in Section 2.3
to be the common state space at s, the most expressive state space that it is common
knowledge at s that everyone is aware of.
Theorem 4. There is no speculative trade in economy C = 〈S1,S2, {ui}i∈I ,Θ, e〉 at
any s ∈ S ∈ S2 if either S∧(s) = S20 or S2 satisfies Projections Preserve Posteriors.
The theorem specifies that there can be no speculative trade at s if either of the
following two conditions is met. First, the common state space at s is equal to the
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payoff relevant state space S20 . In other words, even though the investors receive
differential awareness and information in period 2, it cannot be common knowledge
that everyone has more awareness than in period 1. Second, Projections Preserve
Posteriors is assumed.25
To provide some intuition on why either of these conditions is needed, consider
the following sketch of the proof of the theorem. Suppose that allocation f is Pareto
optimal in period 1 but in period 2 it is common knowledge at state s that allocation
g Pareto dominates f , so that everyone weakly prefers g over f and at least one
investor strictly prefers it. A property of common knowledge, which is also true with
unawareness, implies that there is a public event E ⊆ S∧(s), where g Pareto dominates
f at all s′ ∈ E and, for all i, P i provides a partition of E. The law of iterated
expectations implies that g Pareto dominates f within E also if we replace posterior
with prior beliefs.
The last step requires defining a new allocation h that is identical to g within E
and identical to f outside of E. But then, allocation h Pareto dominates f in period 1,
which is a contradiction. However, this last step may be impossible in an environment
with unawareness if event E ⊆ S∧(s) is not the enlargement of some event of payoff
relevant state space S20 , where allocations are defined. If that is the case, we cannot
find an allocation h that separates, in terms of payoffs, E from its complement.26
If S∧(s) = S20 , the payoff relevant state space coincides with the state space where
common knowledge is expressed, so separation is possible. Alternatively, Projections
Preserve Posteriors implies that the posterior about an event in S20 , specified by s
′ ∈
S∧(s), is identical to the posterior specified by the projection of s′ to S20 , so again
separation is feasible.
The following speculative trade example shows how separation fails if S∧(s) 6=
S20 , Conditional Independence (and therefore Projections Preserve Posteriors) is not
assumed and the public event E is not an enlargement of an event in S20 .
Example 3. In period 1, S1 contains state space S10 = {s1, s2}. In period 2, S2 contains
state spaces S20 and S = {s3, s4, s5}, where S20 is identical to S10 and we denote it in
Figure 3 as S0. Moreover, S  S20 and s3 projects to s1, s4 and s5 project to s2, where
the projections are denoted by the thin arrows. There are two investors, i and j, with
identical utility over monetary outcomes u(x) = log(x). Information and awareness
are symmetric. In particular, P (s1) = P (s2) = P (s5) = S0, P (s3) = P (s4) = {s3, s4}.
The aggregate endowment is 1 in s1 and 1 in s2. Investor i’s prior over S is
(1/2, 1/8, 3/8) and j’s prior is (1/2, 1/4, 1/4). Note that the marginals of both priors
on S0 are (1/2, 1/2). In period 1, where both investors are only aware of S0, they have
the same beliefs (1/2, 1/2). Because they are risk averse, the full insurance allocation f ,
giving each investor 0.5 at s1 and s2, is Pareto optimal. In period 2 and at state s3, both
investors increase their awareness and consider s3 and s4 to be possible. Investor i’s
posterior beliefs are (4/5, 1/5) j’s are (2/3, 1/3). Because beliefs are different, the full
25This means that whereas Heifetz et al. [2013a] do not allow for speculative trade (as they assume
Projections Preserve Posteriors), the current paper does.
26In settings without unawareness but with non expected utility preferences, some separation property
is assumed, usually in the form of Dynamic Consistency, as in Ma [2001] and Halevy [2004], or a suitable
weakening, as in Galanis [2016c].
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Figure 3: Speculative trade
insurance allocation is no longer Pareto optimal. For example, consider the allocation
g which specifies {0.56, 1/3} for i and {0.44, 2/3} for j. Then, it is common knowledge
at s3 that g Pareto dominates f and there is speculative trade.
3.5 Speculation with different priors or information pro-
cessing errors
In this section we briefly examine the behavioral implications in the four trade settings,
of models with different priors or information processing errors with non-partitional
structures.
Several of the overconfidence models which generate trade assume some form of
different priors. For example, Scheinkman and Xiong [2003] model two groups of
investors and two signals that are publicly available. Each group is overconfident
about one signal, regarding the other signal (and the fact that the other group is
overconfident about it) as noise. This can be modelled as having different priors over
the signal structure. In the first three settings that we examined, common priors
are necessary for a no trade result, hence models similar to Scheinkman and Xiong
[2003] with different priors do not preclude speculation. However, Scheinkman and
Xiong [2003] preclude the speculative trade of Section 3.4, which means that as long as
investors correctly apply Bayes’ rule to their subjective prior, there cannot be common
knowledge in the interim that there is a Pareto improvement of an ex ante Pareto
optimal allocation.
The single state space, non-partitional model of Geanakoplos [1989] is closely related
to the present and other multiple state spaces models, in the following sense. If S∗
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is the top or full state space, we can define a possibility correspondence P ∗(s∗) =
P (s∗)S∗ for all s∗ ∈ S∗. That is, we enlarge to S∗ the event P (s∗) that the investor
considers possible at s∗, thus generating a non-partitional information structure P ∗ on
S∗. However, the two models differ in that the definition of common knowledge in the
present model is not the same as the definition of common knowledge in Geanakoplos
[1989], because the former incorporates information about the investors’ awareness,
which the latter ignores.
The following example examines the behavioral implication of Geanakoplos [1989]
in three of the four trade settings.
Example 4. Let S = {s1, s2, s3} be the unique state space and (1/4, 1/2, 1/4) be the
common prior. There are two investors, i and j. Investor i has the trivial partition
P i(s) = S for all s ∈ S. Investor j has a non-partitional information structure, so that
P j(s1) = P
j(s2) = {s1, s2} and P j(s3) = {s2, s3}. Investor i’s posterior beliefs are
always (1/4, 1/2, 1/4), whereas j’s are (1/3, 2/3, 0) at s1 and s2 and (0, 2/3, 1/3) at s3.
Consider the trade bi(s1) = b
i(s3) = 1/4, b
i(s2) = −3/16, bj = −b1. At each state
both investors expect positive gains, so that BbS = S, which implies that B
b
S is common
knowledge at all states. Because both investors expect positive gains at all states, this
is also an always beneficial bet.
Consider now a two-period model, like the one of Section 3.4, where in period 1
both investors have no information and consider all states in S to be possible. Suppose
that both investors are risk averse with u(x) = logx. The economy has a full insurance
allocation f = {1, 1}, giving 1 to each investor at all states. Then, the common prior
(1/4, 1/2, 1/4) and risk aversion imply that this allocation is ex ante Pareto optimal,
yielding a utility of 0 for both. In period 2, i’s information is given by P i and j’s is
given by P j, with the same posterior beliefs as described above. Then, the allocation
g = {bi + 1, bj + 1} Pareto dominates f at all states, hence it is always common
knowledge that f is not Pareto optimal.
This example shows that the model of Geanakoplos [1989] allows for speculative bet-
ting (Section 3.1) and for betting that is always beneficial (Section 3.2), with common
priors. In the present model, speculative betting cannot occur with common priors.
Moreover, an always beneficial bet is not consistent with a common prior that satisfies
Conditional Independence. There is no natural analogue of Conditional Independence
in a single state space model, because the information about the investor’s awareness
is suppressed.
The example also shows that speculative trade can occur, even with common priors.
In Section 3.4 we show that speculative trade cannot occur if the payoff relevant and
the common state space coincide, a condition which is trivially satisfied in the single
state space model of Geanakoplos [1989].
Speculation in equilibrium (Section 3.3) is allowed in both models, unless some
related conditions are imposed. Geanakoplos [1989] imposes three conditions for no
speculation in equilibrium, namely non-delusion, Knowing that You Know (KTYK)
and nested. As shown in Galanis [2015], the first two are satisfied by operator P ∗,
whereas nested is implied by path-independence.
It is interesting to note that models with different priors are related to models
with non-partitional information structures. As Brandenburger et al. [1992] show, any
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correlated equilibrium with different priors can be generated as a correlated equilibrium
with common priors but non-partitional information structures, and vice versa. The
authors point out that equilibria with different priors can be generated with common
priors and significant informational processing errors. This means that a model with
different priors, which does not provide foundations for the investors’ errors or limited
perception, may nevertheless have implications about them which are not clear.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper examines speculation in four different trading environments, relaxing the
assumption that all investors are always fully aware of all relevant dimensions. We find
that what matters for no speculation is whether some form of common knowledge is
assumed, which compensates for the lack of awareness.
We also compare our approach with models that generate speculation through dif-
ferent priors (e.g. models with overconfident investors) or information processing errors
(e.g. Geanakoplos [1989]). We argue that the main advantage of the current approach is
that it endogenizes speculative behavior by explicitly modelling their awareness, with-
out altering the common prior assumption, thus providing an insight into why certain
types of speculation occur whereas other do not. On the other hand, the advantage of
the overconfidence literature is that it generates several well known empirical findings
about speculation, such as large trading volume or value-growth effects (e.g. Daniel
et al. [2001]). For future research, it would be interesting to examine whether insights
from the unawareness literature could be incorporated in those models so as to provide
sharper explanations of these findings.
A Appendix
For an event E ⊆ S, denote by E↑ = ⋃S′∈g(S)ES′ the enlargements of E to all
state spaces which are at least as expressive as S. The following Proposition collects
properties that P i satisfies. Note that properties 0-4 are assumed in Galanis [2013].
Proposition 1. Consider an interactive unawareness belief structure S = 〈S, {rSαSβ }SβSα , {ti}i∈I〉.
The possibility correspondence P i satisfies the following properties.
(0) Confinedness: If s ∈ S then P i(s) ⊆ S′ for some S′  S.
(1) Generalized Reflexivity: s ∈ (P i(s))↑ for every s ∈ Σ.
(2) Stationarity: s′ ∈ P i(s) implies P i(s′) = P i(s).
(3) Projections Preserve Ignorance: If s ∈ S′ and S  S′ then (P i(s))↑ ⊆ (P i(sS))↑.
(4) Projections Preserve Awareness: If s ∈ S′, s ∈ P i(s) and S  S′ then sS ∈
P i(sS).
(5) For all s ∈ Σ, supp ti(s) ⊆ P i(s). If S is a positive belief structure, then
supp ti(s) = P i(s).
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(6) If pi is a positive local prior given S for i then supp ti(s) = supp piS ∩ P i(s) for
all s ∈ AiS(S).
Proof. (0) If s ∈ S then Property 0 of Definition 1 implies ti(s) ∈ ∆S′ for some
S′  S. By the definition of P i, we have P i(s) ⊆ S′.
(1) Suppose s ∈ S′′. From Property 0 of Definition 1, ti(s) ∈ ∆S for some S  S′′.
Property 1 of Definition 1 implies ti(sS) = t
i(s). The definition of P i implies
sS ∈ P i(s), hence s ∈ (P i(s))↑.
(2) Suppose s′ ∈ P i(s). From the definition of P i we have ti(s′) = ti(s), hence
P i(s′) = P i(s).
(3) Suppose s ∈ S′ and S  S′. We need to show that (P i(s))Si(sS) ⊆ P i(sS). From
Generalized Reflexivity and Stationarity we have sSi(s) ∈ P i(sS) and P i(sS) =
P i(sSi(s)). Suppose s
′ ∈ (P i(s))Si(sS). Then, there exists s′′ ∈ P i(s) such that
s′′
Si(sS)
= s′. From the definition of P i, ti(s) = ti(s′′). Property 2 of Definition
1 implies ti(sSi(sS)) = t
i(s′′
Si(sS)
). The definition of P i and s′′
Si(sS)
= s′ imply
s′ ∈ P i(sSi(s)) = P i(sS).
(4) Suppose s ∈ S′, s ∈ P i(s) and S  S′. Then, ti(s) ∈ ∆S′. Property 4 of
Definition 1 implies Sti(sS) = S. Together with Generalized Reflexivity we have
sS ∈ P i(sS).
(5) Suppose s′ ∈ supp ti(s) but s′ /∈ P i(s). Then, ti(s)(P i(s)) < 1, contradicting
Assumption 1. Suppose S is a positive belief structure. If s′ ∈ P i(s) then
ti(s)(s′) > 0 and s′ ∈ supp ti(s).
(6) Suppose pi is a positive local prior for i given S, so that supp piS∩P i(s) 6= ∅. Take
s ∈ AiS(S). Let s′ ∈ supp piS ∩P i(s), so that piS(s′) > 0. By definition, s′ ∈ P i(s)
implies Si(s′) = Si(s) = S. From Stationarity we have that ti(s′′)(s′) = 0 for
all s′′ /∈ P i(s). If ti(s′′)(s′) = 0 for some s′′ ∈ P i(s) then ti(s′′)(s′) = 0 for all
s′′ ∈ P i(s). From the definition of a local prior, this implies that piS(s′) = 0,
a contradiction. Hence, ti(s′′)(s′) > 0 for some (and therefore all) s′′ ∈ P i(s).
Conversely, suppose s′ ∈ supp ti(s), so that ti(s)(s′) > 0. We have shown that
this implies s′ ∈ P i(s), so that ti(s′′)(s′) > 0 for all s′′ ∈ P i(s). Because pi is a
positive local prior given S for i we have piS(P
i(s)) > 0, so setting E = s′ we
have piS(s
′) > 0 and s′ ∈ supp piS ∩ P i(s).
Let E,E′ ⊆ Σ be two sets of states and define P i(E′) =
⋃
s′∈E′
P i(s′) to be the set of
states that i considers possible if the truth lies in E′. Set P i(E′) is not necessarily an
event, as it may contain states of different state spaces. For example, P k(P j(P i(s)))
contains all states that i considers possible that j considers possible that k considers
possible, when s occurs. To simplify the notation, we write P kP jP i(s) instead of
P k(P j(P i(s))). Galanis [2013] uses this notation to provide a definition of common
knowledge (referred to as common knowledge) in his Proposition 2. Below we show
that this is equivalent to the definition of common knowledge provided in the present
22
paper. We then use the results of Galanis [2013] to show that whenever an event is
common knowledge it contains a public event which is partitioned by P i, for all i ∈ I.
Proposition 2. Given a positive belief structure S, the following are equivalent:
• Event E is common knowledge at s ∈ S,
• For any n ∈ N and any sequence of investors i1, . . . , in, P in . . . P i1(s)  S(E)
and (P in . . . P i1(s))S(E) ⊆ E.
Suppose BbS∧(s) is common knowledge at s ∈ S. Then,
• there is a nonempty public event E′ ⊆ S∧(s) such that sS∧(s) ⊆ E′ ⊆ BbS∧(s),
• E′ is partitioned by P i, for all i ∈ I.
Proof. Since S is positive and from (5) of Proposition 1, supp ti(s) = P i(s) implies that
P i(s)  S(E) and (P i(s))S(E) ⊆ E for all i ∈ I if and only if s ∈ B1S(E) =
⋂
i∈I
BiS(E).
We proceed with induction on n ≥ 2.
• For n = 2, we show that s ∈ B2S(E) = B1S(E)
⋂
i∈I
Bi,1S (E) is equivalent P
i2(P i1(s)) 
S(E) and (P i2(P i1(s)))S(E) ⊆ E to all sequences of investors i1, i2 with up to 2
elements.
By definition, s ∈ B2S(E) ⊆ Bi1,1S (E) implies s ∈ Bi1S (B1Si1 (s)(E)), or that P i1(s) ⊆
B1
Si1 (s)
(E) =
⋂
i∈I
Bi
Si1 (s)
(E) ⊆ Bi2
Si1 (s)
(E). This implies that for all s′ ∈ P i1(s),
P i2(s′)  S(E) and (P i2(s′))S(E) ⊆ E. But this is equivalent to P i2(P i1(s)) 
S(E) and (P i2(P i1(s)))S(E) ⊆ E.
Conversely, suppose that for all sequences of investors i1, i2, P
i2(P i1(s))  S(E)
and (P i2(P i1(s)))S(E) ⊆ E, which implies that for all s′ ∈ P i1(s), P i2(s′)  S(E)
and (P i2(s′))S(E) ⊆ E and s ∈ Bi1S (Bi2Si1 (s)(E)). Because this is true for all
sequences of investors with n = 2, we have that s ∈ B2S(E) = B1S(E)
⋂
i∈I
Bi,1S (E).
• Suppose that for n = k, s ∈ BkS(E) is equivalent to P ik . . . P i1(s)  S(E) and
(P ik . . . P i1(s))S(E) ⊆ E for any sequence of investors i1, . . . , ik with up to k
elements.
• We need to show that for n = k+1, s ∈ Bk+1S (E) is equivalent to P ik+1 . . . P i1(s) 
S(E) and (P ik+1 . . . P i1(s))S(E) ⊆ E for any sequence of investors i1, . . . , ik+1 with
up to k + 1 elements.
By definition, s ∈ Bk+1S (E) ⊆ Bi1,kS (E) implies s ∈ Bi1S (BkSi1 (s)(E)), or that
P i1(s) ⊆ Bk
Si1 (s)
(E). Hence, for all s′ ∈ P i1(s), s′ ∈ Bk
Si1 (s)
(E). From the
induction hypothesis we have that, for all s′ ∈ P i1(s), P ik+1 . . . P i2(s′)  S(E)
and (P ik+1 . . . P i2(s′))S(E) ⊆ E, which is equivalent to P ik+1 . . . P i1(s)  S(E)
and (P ik+1 . . . P i1(s))S(E) ⊆ E.
Conversely, suppose that for all sequences of investors i1, . . . , ik+1 with up to k+1
elements, P ik+1 . . . P i1(s)  S(E) and (P ik+1 . . . P i1(s))S(E) ⊆ E, which implies
that for all s′ ∈ P i1(s), P ik+1 . . . P i2(s′)  S(E) and (P ik+1 . . . P i2(s′))S(E) ⊆
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E and, from the induction hypothesis, s ∈ Bi1S (BkSi1 (s)(E)). This implies s ∈
Bi1,kS (E) and since this is true for all i1 we have s ∈ Bk+1S (E) = BkS(E)
⋂
i∈I
Bi,kS (E),
where s ∈ BkS(E) is implied by the induction hypothesis and all sequences of
investors with up to k elements.
Galanis [2013] builds a model of interactive unawareness where the possibility cor-
respondence P i satisfies properties 0-4 of Proposition 1, which are here implied by
assumptions on the belief structure. As the definitions of common knowledge are
equivalent, we can use the results from that paper. In particular, as S is finite, Theo-
rem 3 in Galanis [2013] states that there is a nonempty public event E′ ⊆ S∧(s) such
that sS∧(s) ⊆ E′ ⊆ BbS∧(s). The proof of Theorem 4 in Galanis [2013] shows that E′ is
partitioned by P i, for each i.
In some of the proofs we use the following two notions of “more information”, first
defined and used in Galanis [2015, 2016a].
Definition 17. P 2 is more informative than P 1 given S ∈ S if P 2(s)S ⊆ P 1(s)S for
all s ∈ S.
Definition 18. P i is more informative than the awareness signal of P j given S ∈ S
if, for all s ∈ S, P i(s)S ⊆ EjS(s).
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose there exist bet b and state s ∈ S such that BbS∧(s) is
common knowledge at s. We need to show that there is no positive common prior and
EPCP is satisfied given S.
Suppose not, so there is positive common prior pi given S. From Proposition 2,
there is a nonempty public event E ⊆ S∧(s) such that sS∧(s) ∈ E ⊆ BbS∧(s). Moreover,
E is partitioned by P i, for each i. Without loss of generality, take E to be the smallest
public event, in the sense that there is no public event E′ ⊂ E. Property 0 of Definition
1 and the definition of BbS∧(s) imply that S
i(s1) = S
∧(s) for each s1 ∈ E.
Note that
∑
s′∈Si(s1)
ti(s1)(s
′)bi(s′) > 0, for all s1 ∈ BbS∧(s) and all i ∈ I. From
Proposition 1, point (5), a positive prior implies supp ti(s) = P i(s) for all s ∈ AiS(S).
We therefore have piS(s1)
∑
s′∈P i(s1)
ti(s1)(s
′)bi(s′) > 0, for all s1 ∈ E ⊆ BbS∧(s) and all
i ∈ I. If we add over all s1 ∈ P i(s) and because pi is a positive common prior and
ti(s1) = t
i(s2) for s1, s2 ∈ P i(s), we have
0 <
∑
s1∈P i(s)
∑
s′∈P i(s1)
piS(s1)t
i(s1)(s
′)bi(s′) =
∑
s′∈P i(s1)
∑
s1∈P i(s)
piS(s1)t
i(s1)(s
′)bi(s′) =
∑
s′∈P i(s1)
piS(s
′)bi(s′),
where the last equality is due to the definition of a prior. Adding over all s′ ∈ E
and since E is partitioned by P i, we have that
∑
s′∈E
piS(s
′)bi(s′) > 0. Adding over
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all i ∈ I and since ∑
i∈I
bi(s′) = 0 for all s′ ∈ E we have 0 < ∑
i∈I
∑
s′∈E
piS(s
′)bi(s′) =∑
s′∈E
piS(s
′)
∑
i∈I
bi(s′) = 0, a contradiction.
We have shown that there is no positive common prior given S, but the proof
also showed that for some s ∈ S, there is no common local prior pi given S∧(s) with
supp piS∧(s) = E and smallest nonempty public event E ⊆ S∧(s) with sS∧(s) ∈ E.
This means that the conditions for EPCP are not satisfied, hence EPCP is trivially
true.
Conversely, suppose that S has no positive common prior given S and that it
satisfies EPCP given S. We need to show that there exist state s ∈ S and bet b given
S∧(s) such that BbS∧(s) is common knowledge at s.
There are two cases. First, for all s ∈ S and smallest nonempty public event E ⊆
S∧(s) with sS∧(s) ∈ E, it has a common local prior pi given S∧(s) with supp piS∧(s) =
E. Applying EPCP given S implies that S has a positive common prior given S, a
contradiction.
Second, for some s ∈ S and smallest public event E ⊆ S∧(s) with sS∧(s) ∈ E, it does
not have a common local prior pi given S∧(s) with supp piS∧(s) = E. In the standard
setting of a unique state space and partitional information structures, the Corollary in
Samet [1998] shows that there is a bet such that everyone expects positive gains always
if and only if there is no common prior. In our setting, if we treat E as a standard
state space and the restriction of each P i on E as a partition of E, we can apply this
Corollary to show that there is a bet b given S∧(s) (that assigns 0 to all investors for
states in S∧(s) \ E) such that E = BbS∧(s). Using Proposition 2 which shows that the
present definition of common knowledge is equivalent to that of Galanis [2013], we can
employ Theorem 3 in Galanis [2013] to show that public event E = BbS∧(s) is common
knowledge at s.
Lemma 1. For any state space S ∈ S, for any possibility correspondence P i and the
resulting awareness signal E iS,
{
P i(s)S ∩ E iS(s)
}
s∈S is a partition of S. Moreover, if
P 2 is more informative than P 1 given S ∈ S, then partition {P 2(s)S ∩ E2S(s)}s∈S is
finer than
{
P 1(s)S ∩ E1S(s)
}
s∈S.
Proof. We use the properties of P i that were proven in Proposition 1. From Generalized
Reflexivity, s ∈ P i(s)S ∩E iS(s). Suppose s1 ∈ P i(s)S ∩ES(s). Then, Si(s) = S(s1) and
{s1}Si(s) ∈ P i(s). Generalized Reflexivity implies {s1}Si(s) ∈ P i(s1) and Stationarity
implies P i(s1) = P
i({s1}Si(s)) = P i(s). Hence, P i(s1)S ∩ ES(s1) = P i(s)S ∩ E(s).
For the second claim, suppose s1 ∈ P 2(s)S ∩E2S(s). Because P 2 is more informative
than P 1 given S, we have s1 ∈ P 1(s)S . Stationarity and Projections Preserve Ignorance
imply that S1(s1)  S1(s). Suppose s1 /∈ E1S(s). Then, S1(s1)  S1(s), which implies
that s /∈ P 1(s1)S . Because
{
P 2(s)S ∩ E2S(s)
}
s∈S is a partition, we have P
2(s)S∩E2S(s) =
P 2(s1)
S ∩ E2S(s1), so together with Generalized Reflexivity we have s ∈ P 2(s1)S ⊆
P 1(s1)
S , a contradiction.
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Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose there is a state space S and a bet b given S0 such that
BbS = S. To prove by contradiction, suppose S has a common prior pi given S such
that each i ∈ I satisfies Conditional Independence given S and pi. Fix investor i and
a state s ∈ S such that piS(s) > 0. Then, piSi(s)(P i(s)) > 0 and, as we showed in
the proof of Theorem 1,
∑
s′∈P i(s)
bi(s′S0)piSi(s)(s
′) > 0. Conditional Independence and
Generalized Reflexivity (from Proposition 1) imply that for s1, s2 ∈ P i(s) such that
piSi(s)(s1), piSi(s)(s2) > 0, we have
ti(s)(s1) = piSi(s)(s1|P i(s)) = piS(sS1 |E iS(s) ∩ P i(s)S),
ti(s)(s2) = piSi(s)(s2|P i(s)) = piS(sS2 |E iS(s) ∩ P i(s)S).
Rearranging and since sS1 ⊆ P i(s)S we have
piSi(s)(E iS(s) ∩ sS1 )
piSi(s)(s1)
=
piSi(s)(E iS(s) ∩ sS2 )
piSi(s)(s2)
> 0.
Multiplying
∑
s1∈P i(s)
bi(s1S0)piSi(s)(s1) > 0 by that number we have
∑
s1∈P i(s)
bi(s1S0)piSi(s)(E iS(s) ∩ sS1 ) > 0 =⇒
∑
s1∈P i(s)
bi(s1S0)
∑
s2∈EiS(s)∩sS1
piS(s2) > 0.
Since {s1}S0 = s2S0 for all s2 ∈ sS1 we have∑
s1∈P i(s)
∑
s2∈EiS(s)∩sS1
bi(s2S0)piS(s2) > 0 =⇒
∑
s1∈P i(s)S∩EiS(s)
bi(s1S0)piS(s1) > 0.
From Lemma 1,
{
(P i(s))S ∩ E iS(s)
}
s∈S generates a partition of S. By adding over
all elements of the partition we have that∑
s∈S
bi(sS0)piS(s) > 0.
By adding over all investors and since
∑
i∈I
bi(s0) = 0 for all s0 ∈ S0, we have a contra-
diction.
Suppose S satisfies Projections Preserve Posteriors and that there is no common
local prior given S0. This means that S0 has at least two states. Moreover, because
S0 is the bottom state space, each P
i provides a partition of S0. This means that no
common local prior given S0 is equivalent to no common prior in a standard model
with a unique state space S0. Applying the Corollary of Samet [1998], there is a bet b
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given S0 such that B
b
S0
= S0. Take any S ∈ S. Projections Preserve Posteriors implies
that for any s, s′ ∈ S such that sS0 = s′S0 , we have ti(s)(E) = ti(s′)(E) for all events
E ⊆ S0. Because b is given S0, we have BbS = S.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3 in Geanakoplos
[1989]. Let f = {f i}i∈I be an equilibrium and look at i’s single-investor decision
problem that is induced when the strategy of each j 6= i is fixed. Because of PPOP,
Assumption 1 in Galanis [2015] is satisfied. Consider a fictitious investor k, who is
always fully aware but has no information at all. In particular, P i is more informative
than P k given any S ∈ S. Because k’s awareness is constant, P i is more informative
than k’s awareness signal, given any S ∈ S. Investor k’s available actions are identical
to i’s . If he were to replace i in the game, his optimal action would be zi and his
ex ante payoff would be u¯i. Because either the awareness of P i is path-independent
or i satisfies Conditional Independence given pi and S∗, Theorem 1 in Galanis [2015]
implies that i’s ex ante payoff is weakly higher than k’s, which is u¯i. Since this is true
for all investors, by hypothesis we have f(s∗) = z for all s∗ ∈ S∗.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let pii1 be i’s positive prior given S
1
0 in period 1 and pi
i be i’s
positive prior given S ∈ S2 in period 2. By assumption, pii1 = piiS20 . Suppose that f is ex
ante Pareto efficient, g is feasible and Hg,fS∧(s),j is common knowledge at s ∈ S. Because
S2 is a positive belief structure, from Proposition 1 we have that P i(s) = supp ti(s)
for all s ∈ S ∈ S2.
Using the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1, there is a public event
E ⊆ S∧(s), partitioned by each P i, such that sS∧(s) ⊆ E ⊆ Hg,fS∧(s),j . By the definition
of S∧(s), for all i ∈ I and s′ ∈ E, Si(s′) = S∧(s). By adding the expression in Hg,fS∧(s),j
for each s′ ∈ E and because P i partitions E, we have∑
s1∈E
piiS∧(s)(s1)u
i(gi(s1S20 )) ≥
∑
s1∈E
piiS∧(s)(s1)u
i(f i(s1S20 )),
for each i ∈ I, strict inequality for j.
If S2 satisfies Projections Preserve Posteriors then for each s′ ∈ S∧(s) we have
ti(s′)(E′) = ti(s′
S20
)(E′) for all E′ ∈ S20 . This implies that we can project Hg,fS∧(s),j to
S20 without altering the posterior beliefs. We then have that∑
s1∈ES20
piiS20
(s1)u
i(gi(s1S20 )) ≥
∑
s1∈ES20
piiS20
(s1)u
i(f i(s1S20 )),
for each i ∈ I, strict inequality for j.
In both cases, whether S∧(s) = S20 or S2 satisfies Projections Preserve Posteriors,
and because all state contingent trades are defined on S20 , we can define h
i : S20 → R+
such that hi(s′) = gi(s′) if s′ ∈ E and hi(s′) = f i(s′) otherwise. By construction,
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{hi}i∈I is feasible and we have∑
s1∈S20
piiS20
(s1)u
i(hi(s1S20 )) ≥
∑
s1∈S20
piiS20
(s1)u
i(f i(s1S20 )),
for all i ∈ I, strict inequality for j. By assumption pii1 = piiS20 , hence∑
s1∈S10
pii1(s1)u
i(hi(s1S10 )) ≥
∑
s1∈S10
pii1(s1)u
i(f i(s1S10 )),
for all i ∈ I, strict inequality for j, so that f is not ex ante Pareto efficient given S, a
contradiction.
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